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“Santa Baby, just slip a sable 
under the tree for me1”
Or at least a catchall exception to the hearsay rule?
By Cynthia Ford
In previous columns, I have covered the non-hearsay 
definitions in 801(d).  In my Evidence class at UM, I go on from 
there to look at the specific hearsay exceptions in 803 and 804, 
discussing the requirements and underlying policy for each.  I 
postpone discussion of the “residual” or “catchall” exceptions 
until the very end of our hearsay study, because I am afraid that 
once the students learn about those, they will not see any point 
in focusing on the articulated specific exceptions.  I should (and 
do) confess here that I began this column as a big skeptic of the 
residual exceptions. 
However, as we are in the holiday season, I decided to 
devote this article to what seems like an enormous gift if you 
are struggling to escape from a hearsay objection: the residual 
exceptions to the hearsay rule.  Are they a Black Friday door 
buster? (A related matter of philosophy: Is it ever worth getting 
up to go shop in the middle of the night?) Could Santa load 
Rudolph’s sleigh with residual exceptions and still fit down the 
chimney? Should you bother with a specific exception when 
there is a catchall?  In the process of considering these life-
changing questions, a miracle happened: I was converted and 
now believe the residual exceptions are in fact real, not just a 
lump of coal in the evidence stocking.  Otherwise, why would 
they be included in the rules? And isn’t an extra way around the 
hearsay rule as good as a ’54 Convertible, or “decorations from 
Tiffany’s”?
FEDERAL AND MONTANA  
RESIDUAL HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
Both Montana and the federal systems have a safety valve to 
allow admission of some hearsay even if it does not fit within 
the specific exceptions.   Both systems used to show this by 
having “residual” exceptions as part of Rules 803 and 804.  In 
1997, the federal rule makers removed the residual components 
of Rules 803 and 804, and combined them into new F.R.E. 807, 
which now reads:
(a) In General. Under the following 
circumstances, a hearsay statement is not excluded 
by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is 
not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in 
Rule 803 or 804:
(1) the statement has equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness;
(2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(3) it is more probative on the point for 
which it is offered than any other 
evidence that the proponent can obtain 
through reasonable efforts; and
(4) admitting it will best serve the purposes 
of these rules and the interests of justice.
(807(b) requires “reasonable notice” of the intent to use this 
provision, so the opponent has a “fair opportunity” to meet it.)  
The 1997 Advisory Committee Note to F.R.E. 807 states: 
The contents of Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)
(5) have been combined and transferred to a new 
Rule 807. This was done to facilitate additions 
to Rules 803 and 804. No change in meaning is 
intended. 
When Montana adopted the M.R.E., we generally modeled 
them on the F.R.E., and chose to add this catchall to conform 
to the F.R.E.  The Montana Commission Comment to M.R.E. 
803(24) notes: 
There is no equivalent Montana law to this 
exception. The adoption of this exception changes 
existing Montana law to the extent that it allows 
a court to admit hearsay because an equivalent 
guarantee of trustworthiness exists even though 
there is no specific exception allowing it.
 Montana still retains the two separate versions of the 
residual exception: M.R.E. 803(24) and 804(b)(5).  Rule 803 
provides exceptions to the hearsay rule for certain categories of 
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hearsay, even if the out-of-court declarant is available to testify:
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions: availability of 
declarant immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule, even though the declarant is available as a 
witness: …
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically 
covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but 
having comparable circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness.
Rule 804 provides additional exceptions but only if the 
declarant is unavailable under 804(a).  It ends with 804(b)(5):
Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions: declarant 
unavailable. …
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness: …
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically 
covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but 
having comparable circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness.
The Montana residual clauses are simpler and less restrictive 
than the current federal corollary, omitting any need for prior 
notice. The Montana version is identical to the federal version 
which was submitted by the federal Advisory Committee; 
the difference lies in the additions made to the federal rule by 
Congress.  The Montana Evidence Commission Comment to 
803(24) intentionally rejected the Congressional amendment 
and kept the original federal language:
The Commission believed this exception should 
allow “room for growth and development of the 
law of evidence in the area of hearsay” (Advisory 
Committee’s Note, supra 56 F.R.D. at 320) 
and that the amendments by Congress are too 
restrictive and contrary to the purpose of the 
provision. These amendments can be criticized 
as follows: the requirement that the statement 
be offered as evidence of a “material” fact is 
redundant in requiring relevance as defined 
in Rule 401 and uses outmoded language so 
indicated in the Commission Comments to that 
rule. The requirement that the evidence be more 
probative on the point for which it is offered 
restricts the use of these types of exceptions 
by imposing a requirement similar to that of 
unavailability under Rule 804; this restriction 
would have the effect of severely limiting the 
instances in which the exception would be used 
and be impractical in the sense that a party would 
generally offer the strongest evidence available 
regardless of the existence of this requirement. 
The requirement that the general purposes of 
these rules and interests of justice will be served 
is unnecessarily repetitive in view of Rule 102. 
Finally, the notice requirement is unnecessary 
because of discovery procedures and the 
discretion of the court in allowing advance rulings 
on the admissibility of evidence.
The Montana Commission Comment to 804(b)(5) 
indicates that the same considerations apply to that version 
of the residual rule as to 803(24) and that “the Commission 
Comments to that Rule applies [sic] here.”
The Montana Supreme Court has described the difference 
between the two rules as:
Rule 804(b)(5), M.R.Evid., provides an exception 
to the hearsay rule for statements not specifically 
covered by any of the exceptions enumerated 
in 804(b)(1) through 804(b)(4), but having 
“comparable circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness”. Rule 804(b)(5) has been 
characterized as a “catchall exception” to the 
hearsay rule. However, it is distinguished from 
Rule 803(24), M.R.Evid., where the availability of 
the declarant to testify is immaterial, in that Rule 
804(b)(5) comes into play when the declarant is 
unavailable to testify…
State v. Mayes, 251 Mont. 358, 364, 825 P.2d 1196, 
1200 (1992).  
My review of the cases indicates, though, that the Court uses 
the same loose analysis in deciding cases under both rules. If 
your declarant is available to testify, you should proceed under 
803(24) alone, but if your declarant is unavailable, try both 
803(24 and 804(b)(5).
RECENT MONTANA CASES
My personal view of the residual exceptions was that when 
you have to use them to surmount a hearsay exception, you 
are on the ropes and unlikely to succeed.  I vastly prefer to 
use one or more of the specific exceptions or the non-hearsay 
definitions than to launch upon a vague “circumstantial 
guarantee of trustworthiness” quest. The Montana Supreme 
Court also has several times indicated that the residual 
exceptions are an extraordinary tool:
the residual exception “should be used sparingly, 
and only in exceptional circumstances,” … 
Hocevar, ¶ 50 (citing  State v. Brown, 231 Mont. 
334, 338, 752 P.2d 204, 207 (1988).
Larchick v. Diocese of Great Falls-Billings, 2009 
MT 175, 350 Mont. 538, 547-48, 208 P.3d 836, 
845.  
However, it turned out that I am too squeamish, and 
HEARSAY, from previous page
HEARSAY, next page
Page 22 December/January 2013
“sparingly” is not the same as “never.”  Montana lawyers 
have presented residual exception arguments to the Supreme 
Court since 2000 in 9 cases under 803(24) and 8 cases under 
804(b)(5)2.  (There is some overlap where both were used in a 
particular case).  I discuss some of these below, as illustrative of 
the Court’s approach to these catchalls.  Because the Court has 
treated hearsay by child declarants as a separate category, I do 
the same.
In In re Estate of Harmon, 360 Mont. 150, 253 P.3d 821, 
2011 MT 84, the proponents of a holographic will made before 
the testator executed her written formal will filed affidavits 
opposing summary judgment for the named heir.  The affiants 
recounted various statements that the testator had allegedly 
made about being “hoodwinked” into signing the formal will 
and about her desire to stick with the handwritten version. The 
Supreme Court observed:
 In sum, the affidavits contain purported 
statements of the decedent, Cecilia, to show her 
intent to give property to Waitt and to allow 
Knudson to purchase his rental home at discount, 
and about Harmon’s allegedly heavy-handed and 
self-interested treatment of Cecilia…. 
Thus, the Court found, the statements were hearsay and 
the affidavits inadmissible unless some hearsay exception 
applied.  The appellant advanced several specific exceptions 
and both of the catchall exceptions (803(24) and 804(b)(5)) 
for admissibility; the Supreme Court rejected all of them and 
found the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in granting 
summary judgment for the heir. 
 ¶ 37 Finally, Waitt claims the statements are 
admissible under M.R. Evid. 804(b)(5). This rule 
is a “catch-all” provision when the declarant is 
unavailable, and allows admission of a statement 
that has “comparable circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness” to the four enumerated 
exceptions in Rule 804(b): former testimony, 
statements made under belief of impending 
death, statements against interest, and statements 
of personal or family history. There are no such 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness 
associated with the statements in the affidavits 
submitted by Waitt. Given the often highly 
contentious nature of estate distribution, the 
opposite is true. Montana law has historically 
been hostile to the admissibility of out-of-court 
statements made by the testator regarding his 
or her testamentary intentions when a valid will 
exists and the testator’s mental capacity is not at 
issue. In re Colbert’s Est., 31 Mont. at 472–73, 78 
P. at 974–75 (quoting Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 
2  These counts are from a WestlawNext search using the rule numbers as the 
search term.  Several of the cases, though, when read, merely indicated that a 
residual exception had been cited by the lawyer, but was not considered by the 
Court because another specific exception applied.  
U.S. 552, 573–74, 21 S.Ct. 474, 482–83, 45 L.Ed. 
663 (1901)). The District Court did not abuse its   
discretion in concluding that Rule 804(b)(5) was 
inapplicable.
253 P.3d at 830. 
The Court was briefer but equally clear in rejecting 803(24), 
the other “catch-all,” as an alternative basis for admission.
Jordan Larchik was a freshman at Billings Central High 
School when he suffered a permanent eye injury during a P.E. 
class on lacrosse.  The case went to a jury trial, where the P.E. 
teacher, Hardenbrook, testified that he was present in the 
gymnasium during the class. Several defense experts rendered 
opinions based on this fact.  The jury rendered a verdict for the 
defense.
About six weeks after the trial ended, plaintiff’s counsel Liz 
Halvorsen received a phone call.  The caller identified himself 
as a friend” of the P.E. teacher, and said that Hardenbrook 
had asked him to call to tell Ms. Halvorsen that he had been 
pressured to, and did, lie about his presence in the gym at the 
time of the accident.  Ms. Halvorsen immediately notified the 
trial judge of this call, and subsequently moved for a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence.  In support of her motion, 
the plaintiff submitted an affidavit from Ms. Halvorsen as well 
as phone company records substantiating that a call had been 
placed from a cell phone belonging to teacher Hardenbrook to 
Ms. Halvorsen’s phone.  
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the lower court 
abused its discretion when it denied the new trial, and 
remanded the case for a new trial.  It specifically held that Ms. 
Halvorsen’s affidavit was admissible even though it contained 
hearsay, under 803(24):
¶ 31 Furthermore, despite the Diocese’s argument 
to the contrary, the District Court did not err 
in determining that Halverson’s affidavit was 
admissible even though it contained hearsay. 
Under the residual exception to the general 
prohibition on hearsay, a statement is admissible 
even though it is not specifically covered by the 
other exceptions on hearsay if it has “comparable 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” 
M.R. Evid. 803(24). This exception “looks to the 
circumstances surrounding a hearsay statement 
when it is made—the circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness that lend reliability to the hearsay 
statement in lieu of cross-examination.” State v. 
Hocevar, 2000 MT 157, ¶ 50, 300 Mont. 167, 7 
P.3d 329. (Internal quotations omitted.) While 
the residual exception “should be used sparingly, 
and only in exceptional circumstances,” we 
conclude that Halverson’s affidavit was admissible 
as a trustworthy statement of an officer of Court 
under M.R. Evid. 803(24). Hocevar, ¶ 50 (citing 
State v. Brown, 231 Mont. 334, 338, 752 P.2d 204, 
207 (1988). Significantly, the Diocese does not 
necessarily dispute Halverson’s description of 
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the phone call from “Mr. Peterson” or the phone 
record which indicates that the call was placed 
from Hardenbrook’s cell phone.  (Emphasis 
added)
Larchick v. Diocese of Great Falls-Billings, 2009 
MT 175, 350 Mont. 538, 547-48, 208 P.3d 836, 
845.
In In Re J.J.L., 355 Mont. 23, 223 P.3d 921 (2010), a public 
defender for a father facing termination of his parental rights 
failed to object to hearsay statements of the children and their 
mother made to a detective and two counselors.  (Neither 
the children nor the mother testified themselves).  The trial 
court apparently was concerned about the use of this hearsay 
in his decision, and asked the parties to brief its admissibility.  
The State filed a brief; the father’s attorney did not, and thus 
the judge deemed an admission by the father that the State’s 
position was well taken.  The judge ruled that the hearsay 
statements were admissible under the residual hearsay 
exception in Rule 803(24).  Based on these statements, the 
children were adjudicated Youths in Need of Care.  Although 
the Supreme Court did not directly discuss the merits of the 
application of the residual exception, it did hold that the failure 
to object to the hearsay and the failure to file a brief on the issue 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 3 
The defendant in State v. Hocevar, 300 Mont. 167, 7 P.3d 
329, 2000 MT 157 was the mother of Wesley, who was four 
years old when he was taken to the hospital for an overdose 
of Benadryl.  The treating physician, who was aware of the 
prior deaths of two other children, reported her suspicion of 
Munchausen-by-proxy syndrome.  Wesley recovered, but Susan 
was convicted of criminal endangerment.  (The jury could not 
reach a verdict on the other crimes charged).  On appeal, she 
argued that she should have been allowed to introduce at trial 
the videotape of Wesley’s interviews, which occurred five and 
twelve days after the overdose.  When the prosecution objected 
on hearsay grounds, the defense cited three hearsay exceptions 
in 803: 803(1),“present sense impression;” 803(5) “recorded 
recollection;” and the residual exception in 803(24)4.  The 
Supreme Court rejected both specified exceptions, and also held 
that the trial court was correct in refusing to apply the residual 
exception:
The residual exception “look[s] to the 
circumstances surrounding a hearsay statement 
when it is made-the ‘circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness’ that lend reliability to the hearsay 
3  A 2013 case also discussed failure to object to clear hearsay (again, reports of 
sexual assault by a child to a trusted adult) as ineffective assistance of counsel.  
The majority held that it did not, citing possible strategic considerations for not 
objecting.  Justice McKinnon wrote a strong dissent, joined by Justice Cotter.  Nei-
ther opinion actually considered whether either of the residual exceptions would 
apply.  See, State v. Aker, 371 Mont. 491, 310 P.3d 506, 2013 MT 253.
4  Wesley did not appear to testify at trial, although there was no specific finding 
or argument that he was unavailable.  If he in fact was, the defense technically 
could have also cited the other residual exception, 804(b)(5), but it seems they did 
not, and it is not at all likely to have changed the ruling at trial or on appeal.
statement in lieu of cross-examination.” State v. 
J.C.E. (1988), 235 Mont. 264, 272, 767 P.2d 309, 
314. “Everything that bears on the credibility of 
the speaker and the accuracy of his statement 
counts....” Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 8.65 (1995). We have 
held that the residual exceptions “should be used 
sparingly, and only in exceptional circumstances.” 
State v. Brown (1988), 231 Mont. 334, 338, 752 
P.2d 204, 207.
State v. Hocevar, 2000 MT 157, 300 Mont. 167, 
183, 7 P.3d 329, 341.  
The Court recited the trial judge’s findings about the 
reliability of the interviews, which he apparently viewed in 
making his decision, and summarily concluded: “The admission 
of the videotaped interviews was properly denied under the 
residual exception because the videotapes did not manifest 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.”  300 Mont. at 
184.  
The Supreme Court affirmed the opposite ruling in the 
same year, obviously on different facts.  In Estate of Silver, the 
opponents were the decedent’s son and the decedent’s estate, 
which was trying to reclaim approximately $200,000 in cash 
which the son claimed his father gave him.  The son, Jack, had 
visited his 86 year-old father, Morris, on the eve of surgery, 
and they agreed both that it would be necessary for the father 
to have at-home caregivers after he was released, and that 
the large amount of cash the father kept in his house should 
be moved somewhere safer.  The son and the father’s friend/
employee arranged for a safe deposit box at a bank, and brought 
the paperwork home for the father to sign.  The box was in the 
name of the father, but the son was also to be “a signer allowed 
access,” according to the father’s written instructions to the 
bank.  The banker had checked the “joint tenant” box on the 
lease form.  A few days before the father died, the son visited 
the safe deposit box and removed the cash in it, putting it into a 
separate safe deposit box which was in the son’s name only.  
The son moved for summary judgment, which the estate 
opposed.  When the trial judge granted summary judgment for 
the estate, requiring the son to return the money, he appealed 
and alleged error in the judge’s admission of the hearsay 
statements of the father (who was obviously unavailable under 
804(a)) under the residual exception.  The Supreme Court 
affirmed both the evidentiary ruling and the final judgment:
¶ 18 Over Jack’s objection, the District Court 
allowed testimony by Kathleen St. John and 
Carolyn Sauro regarding statements Morris made 
to them concerning the money in the safe deposit 
box. Kathleen stated by affidavit that when Morris 
agreed to put the money in the safe deposit box, 
he asserted that it was still his. She stated that she 
never heard him say he intended to make a gift of 
the money to Jack or that he did not consider it to 
be his money. Carolyn stated in her affidavit that 
Morris was most emphatic that the contents of 
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the safe deposit box were to remain his. She also 
attested that at no time did Morris indicate he had 
made any gift to Jack of the contents of the safe 
deposit box and once during the summer of 1997 
he said he may have to go to the safe deposit box 
to secure some of his cash.
In re Estate of Silver, 2000 MT 127, 299 Mont. 506, 
509, 1 P.3d 358, 360.  
The Court found that the admission of the affidavits fell 
within the residual exception of 803(24):
¶ 21 Similarly, [to two earlier cases discussed 
at length] in the present case, the contested 
testimony is evidence of Morris›s stated intent to 
retain ownership of the cash which he had placed 
in the safe deposit box. Rule 803(24), M.R.Evid., 
provides that statements not covered by the 
enumerated exceptions to the hearsay rule will be 
allowed if comparable circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness exist. Here, the statements put 
into context Morris›s opening of the safe deposit 
box and the placement of the cash within the box. 
We hold that the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting the testimony about 
Morris›s statements of intent concerning the 
money which he arranged to have placed in the 
safe deposit box
2000 MT 127, 299 Mont. at 510-11, 1 P.3d at 361.5 
Silver was cited by the appellant in Estate of Harmon, 
discussed above, but held inapplicable.
 CHILD HEARSAY
The Montana Supreme Court has faced several difficult 
cases involving child witnesses.  The unique nature of these 
cases led it to carve a subset of “residual” hearsay requirements 
to determine the admissibility of statements made by the child 
declarant to an adult who then testifies to prove the matter 
asserted by the child.  The legislature stepped in to codify a 
special exception to the hearsay rule for criminal cases, but 
some questions remain undecided about the interpretation and 
application of that statute, and it does not apply to civil cases. 
State v. S.T.M., 317 Mont. 159, 75 P.3d 1257, 2003 MT 221, 
involved a charge of incest by the defendant with his toddler 
daughter.  Both sides agreed that the girl was incompetent (she 
5  Justice Trieweiler dissented on the holding that the statements by Morris in 
the affidavits were hearsay at all; if they were, he disagreed with their admission.  
However, he took the view that the statements were not offered for the truth of 
the matter they asserted, but “were offered, instead, to prove that Morris actu-
ally made the statement, and, therefore, depended solely on the credibility of 
Kathleen St. John and Caroline Sauro.”  In my Evidence class, we call this “offered 
not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to prove the state of mind of the 
speaker.”  If this is the reason they were offered, then the out of court statements 
by Morris do not meet the definition of hearsay under 801(c), and are not barred 
by 802, so there would be no need to deal with the residual (or any) exception.
was only 35 months old, and described as “shy”), and thus 
“unavailable” per 804(a), to testify at trial.  The trial judge held 
that the daughter’s out-of-court statements to her mother and a 
social worker were admissible under 804(b)(5).  On appeal, the 
Supreme Court applied an abuse of discretion standard:
¶ 14 …Where a court is determining 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, we 
will defer to the court’s decision unless an abuse 
of discretion is clearly shown. J.C.E., 235 Mont. at 
275, 767 P.2d at 316 (citing State v. LaPier (1984), 
208 Mont. 106, 676 P.2d 210).
The Court then reviewed its prior law on the use of 804(b)
(5) for evidence from young victims of sexual abuse:
The exception permits the admission of out-
of-court statements, which would otherwise 
be excluded as hearsay, if the statements have 
“comparable circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness” to the enumerated exceptions to 
the hearsay rule.
¶ 18 In J.C.E., we established a framework to 
guide district courts in determinations about the 
admissibility of hearsay testimony from young 
child victims in sexual assault cases. Before 
hearsay testimony can be considered under Rule 
804(b)(5), we held the district court must make 
the following preliminary findings:
1. The victim must be unavailable to testify, 
whether through incompetency, illness, or 
some other like reason (e.g., trauma induced 
by the courtroom setting);
2. The proffered hearsay must be evidence of 
a material fact, and must be more probative 
than any other evidence available through 
reasonable means; and
3. The party intending to offer the hearsay 
testimony must give advance notice of that 
intention. J.C.E., 235 Mont. at 273, 767 P.2d 
at 315.
The Supreme Court quoted at length from the 
trial judge’s careful finding and conclusions 
on these factors6, and stated “¶ 22 Were we to 
decide this case solely on the basis of the hearsay 
challenge, we might simply affirm here, and end 
our analysis.”  
In fact, the Court went on, saying “However, S.T.M. also 
challenged the admission of the child’s statements in light of his 
Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers. As explained 
below, we will no longer consider these two challenges 
independently.”  The Supreme Court ultimately held that a 
6  The defendant had raised a Confrontation Clause objection in addition to his 
hearsay objection at trial, but the trial judge virtually ignored it in his ruling.  The 
Supreme Court devoted much of its opinion to the constitutional element, but 
ultimately affirmed admission of the statements over both objections.
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fourth factor which J.C.E. had established, (and which I omitted 
from the list in the quotation above) existence of corroborating 
evidence, is no longer to be considered in deciding conjoined 
Confrontation/804(b)(5) cases.  
The Court then assessed the young daughter’s hearsay 
statements without considering whether they were 
corroborated.  It concluded that the circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness inherent in the statement sufficed to 
withstand both the hearsay and Confrontation Clause 
objections:
¶ 39 Upon considering the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding K.M.’s hearsay 
statements, exclusive of the corroborating 
evidence, we conclude that her statements were 
supported by the particularized guarantees 
of trustworthiness necessary to withstand a 
Confrontation Clause challenge. In fact, her 
statements satisfied a number of the factors upon 
which state and federal courts have historically 
relied for indicia of reliability. See ¶ 31. Most 
notably, K.M. made the initial statement to her 
mother spontaneously. Her statement referenced 
oral-genital contact, a matter not normally within 
the contemplation of a toddler under three years 
old. Further, K.M.’s mother was reluctant to 
participate in the prosecution of her husband, 
which makes her a particularly reliable witness to 
relate the hearsay statement. Moreover, neither 
she nor K.M. had any reason to fabricate the story.
State v. S.T.M., 2003 MT 221, 317 Mont. 159, 171, 
75 P.3d 1257, 1264.  
The Court acknowledged more difficulty with the girl’s 
statement to the social worker, which was videotaped and 
played to the jury, but ultimately held that it, too, was 
admissible.  
S.T.M. was decided before the U.S. Supreme Court rewrote 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in Crawford v. Washington 
in 2004.  The Montana Supreme Court acknowledged this in 
2007:
¶ 33 We note further that the District Court 
did not discuss the “corroborating evidence” 
factors in light of our holding in State v. S.T.M. 
that corroborating evidence could no longer be 
considered in assessing a hearsay statement’s 
reliability. 2003 MT 221, ¶ 34, 317 Mont. 159, ¶ 
34, 75 P.3d 1257, ¶ 34. We decided S.T.M. prior 
to Crawford and our holding was based on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Idaho v. Wright, 
497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 
(1990). We removed the corroborating evidence 
factor because we could not “conceive of a case in 
which the admission of the hearsay statements of 
an alleged victim of child sexual abuse would not 
implicate the Confrontation Clause as well as the 
rule against hearsay.” S.T.M., ¶ 34. The Supreme 
Court’s rulings in Crawford and Davis recently 
have clarified that the Confrontation Clause only 
applies to testimonial statements; thus, it is now 
entirely conceivable that a hearsay statement that 
fails to implicate the Confrontation Clause may 
nevertheless be inadmissible hearsay. Davis, 547 
U.S. at ––––, 126 S.Ct. at 2274–75. However, the 
“corroborating evidence” factor does not affect 
the case before us; the District Court’s lack of 
“corroborating evidence” analysis could only 
advantage Spencer because the District Court did 
not consider as evidence S.S.’s and R.S.’s physical 
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injuries discovered by Dr. Gerrity. Thus, we leave 
for another day an analysis of S.T.M.’s continued 
vitality. In light of Crawford,  however, we note 
that courts must again consider Confrontation 
Clause and hearsay challenges independently, 
contrary to our announcement in S.T.M., ¶ 22.
State v. Spencer, 2007 MT 245, 339 Mont. 227, 
237, 169 P.3d 384, 392-93. 
Even earlier, in State v. Osborne, the state was able to 
introduce the hearsay statements of a 33-month-old child 
sexual abuse victim made to a sheriff’s deputy and a social 
worker, over the defendant’s hearsay exception.  
¶ 20 There was no evidence, other than the 
hearsay evidence, implicating Osborne. Therefore 
it was evidence of a material fact, more probative 
than any other evidence available through 
reasonable means. However, the material fact that 
the State sought to prove through the hearsay 
evidence was not simply the identity of the rapist, 
it was that Cassie identified Osborne as the rapist. 
The fact that she may have identified Heen to 
the deputy and the social worker is evidence of 
a different fact, and does not constitute more 
probative evidence of the same material fact. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the hearsay 
evidence of Cassie’s statements to Heen and Jamie 
addressed a material fact and was more probative 
than any other evidence available through 
reasonable means. We further conclude that the 
District Court made adequate preliminary inquiry 
before it admitted the hearsay statements.
State v. Osborne, 1999 MT 149, 295 Mont. 54, 59, 
982 P.2d 1045, 1047.
Abuse and neglect cases also involve children who have 
the primary personal knowledge of their treatment, but may 
be reluctant or unable to testify at trial.  The trial witnesses 
usually are adults to whom the children have spoken out of 
court.  Although the Confrontation Clause is not implicated, 
the statements are still hearsay and frequently prompt “residual 
exception” responses to hearsay objections.  
In Re O.A.W., 335 Mont. 304, 153 P.3d 6, 2007 MT 13, was 
decided the same year as the Spencer case cited above.  Because 
O.A.W. was an abuse and neglect, not a criminal, case, M.C.A. 
46-16-220 (see below) did not apply.  The prosecution moved 
in limine for an order allowing hearsay testimony about the 
children’s statements to be admitted at the adjudicatory hearing 
at which they were found to be youths in need of care:
At the hearing, after argument on the matter, 
the court ruled from the bench that the children 
were unavailable to testify and that videotaped 
interviews made by law enforcement officer 
Lewis Barnett, social worker Shelly Verwolf, and 
Dr. Cindy Miller, a clinical psychologist, were 
admissible under M.R. Evid. 804(b)(5).
In re O.A.W., 2007 MT 13, 335 Mont. 304, 306, 
153 P.3d 6, 9. 
Later, the state petitioned for permanent termination of 
parental rights and, after another hearing, the Court granted 
the petition.  The parents both appealed, arguing, inter alia, that 
the Court erred in allowing witnesses to present the children’s 
out of court statements under 804(b)(5).  The Supreme Court 
affirmed both the finding that the trauma to the children 
from testifying in court against their parents7 made them 
“unavailable” and the holding that the hearsay was trustworthy 
enough for 804(b)(5) to apply at the adjudicatory hearing:
¶ 35 The court further found that the statements of the 
children were trustworthy, pursuant to M.R. Evid. 804(b)(5) 
and its “residual exception,”:
And having viewed the tapes, I believe that the 
two interviews in question, in particular, were 
well-documented and would give the trier of fact 
in this case the ability to assess the contents of 
what they’re saying for accuracy without the need 
for cross-examination, and I don’t do that lightly, 
but I think weighing all those factors, I think the 
truth here could be discerned without subjecting 
these children to cross-examination or the trauma 
of facing their parents in court. So I’ll find that 
the children are unavailable as witnesses for this 
hearing.
¶ 36 The District Court›s finding on this issue was 
supported by the testimony of Dr. Ruggiero and 
Dr. Miller. This finding was not arbitrary and was 
made with conscientious judgment. …
335 Mont. at 311, 153 P.3d at 12.  
(The Supreme Court also affirmed admission of the 
children’s hearsay through their treating therapist at the final 
termination hearing, although that appeared to be under 803(4) 
and 703 rather than the residual exception.)
STATUTORY TREATMENT  
OF CHILD VICTIM HEARSAY
In 2003, the Montana legislature enacted M.C.A. 46-16-220, 
entitled “Child Hearsay Exception—Criminal Proceedings.”  It 
basically incorporates the criteria announced by the Supreme 
Court in the S.T.M. case, discussed above.  This statute creates 
an additional hearsay exception for out-of-court statements 
by child8 (under 15) victims or witnesses in sexual assault 
7  There was considerable expert testimony on this point.
8  The statute defines “child” as “a person under 15 years of age.”  It does not 
specify whether the relevant age is that at the time of the crime, the time of the 
statement, or the time of trial.  I expect that this ambiguity will come up, and be 
resolved judicially, in short order, because of the flood of cases implicating this 
kind of evidence.
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and abuse cases: “Otherwise inadmissible hearsay may be 
admissible in evidence in a criminal proceeding, if…”  (One of 
the requirements is that the child victim be unavailable at trial, 
so if this exception were reflected in the Rules of Evidence, it 
should be part of 804 rather than 803.)  Although S.T.M. found 
that the existence of corroborating evidence was not to be used 
in deciding the admissibility of child victim hearsay statements, 
this factor is included in the statute.  Further, the statute 
contains two procedural requirements: the proponent must give 
detailed notice of intent to introduce the evidence and the judge 
must file written findings and conclusions on the admissibility 
of the child’s testimony.
State v. Spencer, supra, is the only reported case to discuss 
M.C.A. 46-16-220 at length.  There, the trial judge issued a 
12-page order admitting the hearsay statements offered by 
the State with the requisite notice.  On appeal, among other 
things, defendant argued that the trial judge violated the statute 
by failing to delineate portions of his decision “Findings of 
Fact” and “Conclusions of Law.”   The Supreme Court held 
that the trial judge “adequately complied” with the statute and 
affirmed the admission of the victim’s statements through 
her foster mother and a counselor. 9 (It also found that the 
statements were “non-testimonial” under Crawford so that the 
Confrontation Clause objection did not bar admission either).
The statute is ambiguous as to the time at which the 
declarant’s age is to be measured.  Perhaps more importantly, it 
does not indicate whether it supplants the residual exceptions 
for child-victim hearsay.  Before the statute, Montana cases 
had resorted to the residual exceptions for this special form 
of hearsay.  The unresolved question is whether a party who 
wants to introduce a child-victim’s statements through an adult 
witness must meet the requirements of M.C.A. 46-16-220, or 
if the proponent is still free to argue for admission also under 
803(24) and/or 804(b)(5). 
The only pronouncement on this subject is a single sentence 
in Spencer:
Section 46–16–220, MCA, sets forth the 
requirements for admitting child hearsay in 
Montana criminal proceedings.
State v. Spencer, 2007 MT 245, 339 Mont. 227, 
234, 169 P.3d 384, 390.  
However, it does not appear that the State in that case 
actually presented the issue of the continued applicability of 
9  Obviously, it is better for the judge to actually label the portions of her writ-
ten order on the admissibility of evidence under this statute as “Findings of Fact” 
and “Conclusions of Law” to avoid the technical challenge that the court failed to 
comply with the statute.  Lawyers presenting proposed orders to judges should be 
sure to do so.
the residual hearsay exceptions, nor did the Supreme Court 
directly address the question.  Thus, an advocate might consider 
invoking all three bases for admission of the hearsay statements 
of child witnesses in criminal cases.  In civil cases, the statute 
does not apply, so the residual exceptions are still the only law 
at play.  
NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
As I read through the significant cases, I kept a running tally 
of the rulings of the trial judges on residual exception claims 
and the results on appeal.  Under 803(24), I considered five 
cases.  In two, the trial judges admitted the hearsay and in two, 
the trial judges refused the hearsay.  The Supreme Court upheld 
all four rulings, finding no error. Under 804(b)(5), three cases 
admitted the hearsay and one refused it.  Again, the Supreme 
Court found no error in any of the rulings.
CONCLUSION
Montana has two rule-based “catchall” or “residual” hearsay 
exceptions, and a statutory exception which applies only to 
child declarants in criminal cases.  The purpose of the residual 
exceptions is to make “room for growth and development of the 
law of evidence in the area of hearsay.10”  
Although Montana cases express the general policy that 
these exceptions are to be used sparingly, cases do affirm this 
route to admissibility when the enumerated hearsay exceptions 
do not apply.  
Accordingly, I recommend that proponents of hearsay 
evidence first try to fit their hearsay into one or more of the 
specific exceptions of 803 and 804.  (I am a big believer in 
skinning the cat in as many ways as possible).  If the outcome 
is doubtful, deploy the wild card residual exception(s): if your 
declarant is available to testify, you should proceed under 
803(24) alone, but if your declarant is unavailable, try both 
803(24 and 804(b)(5).  In either case, be prepared to identify 
the circumstances about the declarant, the witness, the subject 
matter, and the statement which constitute “circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness” comparable to those in the 
rest of the rule (803, 804, or both) which contains the residual 
exception(s).  If you are able to convince the trial court to use 
this safety valve, chances are the Supreme Court will affirm.11
As we say at my house, “Santa only comes to those who 
believe in him.”  If you believe in the residual exceptions, they 
might come true for you and your client.  Better than a fur coat?
Cynthia Ford is a professor at the University of Montana School of Law 
where she teaches Civil Procedure, Evidence, Family Law, and Remedies.
10  Montana Commission Comment to 803(24), citing the federal Advisory Com-
mittee Note and rejecting the more restrictive federal provisions.
11  Better not use Eartha Kitt’s argument: “Think of all the fun I’ve missed/Think 
of all the ’fellas that I haven’t kissed/ Next year I could be just as good/ If you’ll 
check off my Christmas list [or at least allow the hearsay].”
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